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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Issues Presented. 
1. Whether the district court correctly ruled that Mr. Lundberg, as trustee, 
owed a limited statutory duty to the Russells, but that Mr. Lundberg, the Lundberg Firm, 
and Rodney did not owe a fiduciary duty to the Russells in the absence of a confidential 
relationship between them? 
2. Whether the district court correctly ruled that the Lundberg Parties and 
Rodney did not have a confidential relationship with the Russells at the time the Trust 
Deed was executed or at any time thereafter, and, therefore, the Lundberg Parties and 
Rodney did not owe a fiduciary or similar duty to the Russells? 
3. Whether the district court correctly ruled that the Lundberg Parties and 
Rodney were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Russells5 claims for breach of 
fiduciary duty and constructive fraud? 
4. Whether the district court correctly ruled that Mr. Lundberg satisfied all 
statutory duties owed by him to the Russells in connection with the foreclosures of the 
Russells' Trust Deed? 
5. Whether the district court correctly ruled that the Lundberg Parties and 
Rodney had no contractual relationship with the Russells, and therefore owed no 
contractual duty to them, and that the Lundberg Parties were entitled to judgment as a 
4842-6971-1616XU593.0O1 1 
matter of km t HI (lie R ussclls' claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing? 
* Whether the district coun cv>riccu\ -,i >JA .• . * • •. •;- ,?N \ nk . u M >.• • 
,111 \ admissible evidence that the Lundberg Parties or Rodney made any misrepresentation 
to them, or reasonably relied upon any misrepresentation, and therefore the Lundberg 
Parties and Rodney were entitled to judgment as a matlc i of In » on the Russells" claims 
•• *iau ; <e\: iieghgem :-r.sren-esentation? •,. 
Whether the district court correctly ruled that the Lundberg Parties and 
Rodney were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on 1:1 J K > - C us ..lamis •• . ;;st 
enrichment where 11n • 1111«11111111i"d e\ ide11ee established that the Lundberg Parties and 
Rodney had not been unjustly enriched, either by the Russells or otherwise? 
8. Whether the district court correctly ruled that i... ».._..:UL .-.-. :\v ^> .41 .. 
RodiiL-^  ••• ^: -.-jnuiL uu,:u - • 'n^ of tew on the Russells' claim for illegal 
price discrimination in violation of the Utah Unfair Practices Act where the Russells 
lacked standing to pursue that claim and where the undisputed evidence csiaousiu;> •: :. 
the I iiiitlbeii" Parlies and Kodiu'v did noi \ ioliiie The 1 H'A? 
9. Whether the district court correctly ruled that the Lundberg Parties and 
Rodney were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on me i .::seii^ .; ( 
conspiracy where lln: Russell •. tailed In present t lenr and convincing evidence of any 
illegal conspiracy? 
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10. Whether the district court correctly ruled that the Lundberg Parties and 
Rodney were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Russells' claim for punitive 
damages? 
B. Standard of Review, 
Where the claims against the Lundberg Parties and Rodney were decided on 
summary judgment, the district court's decision with respect to those claims are reviewed 
for correctness. The facts relating to those claims are viewed in the light most favorable 
to the Russells and no deference is given to the district court's conclusions. City 
Consumer Services, Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234, 239 (Utah 1991); Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield v. State of Utah, 779 P.2d 634, 643-37 (Utah 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES 
AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
OF THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-19 to -36 (Utah's trust deed foreclosure statutes). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court 
Below. 
Mr. Lundberg, as trustee under a Trust Deed executed by the Russells on their 
property, commenced three separate non-judicial trust deed foreclosures on the property 
on behalf of the trust deed beneficiary. Each foreclosure was in response to a separate 
loan default by the Russells. On each occasion, the Lundberg Firm purchased a title 
insurance product known as a "trustee's sale guaranty" ["TSG"] from Backman-Stewart 
Title Services, Ltd. to identify the legal owner of the property and any liens or 
4842-6971-1616 LU593 001 3 
encumbrances on the property Mr. Lundberg has an ownership interest in Backman-
Stewart Title and its parent company, Backman Title Co. With the third foreclosure, the 
Lundberg Firm hired Rodney ^ .. . . . •• !.•<> •. * * ' 
• ndlv * ii s » handle the posting and publication of the notice of sale. The 
Lundberg Firm invoiced the beneficiary for the actual amounts it paid to Backman-
Stewart for the XSGs and to Rodney foi the posting ami publishing services in accordance 
vuth ::- • :*/".-:> i fi.^h beneficiary reimbursed the Lundberg Firm for those 
amounts. The Lundberg Parties complied with all statutory duties required of a trustee in 
connection with the foreclosures. 
•; Prior to each foreclosi ire sale of the property, the Russells cured their default and 
reinstated their loan by paying to the beneficiary the amounts owed on their loan, together 
with the costs actually incurred by the beneficiary in connection w llli eat. li )«^ vcl< vsuri;, 
Thcku^,- : ! : mdher" D-rtio; and Rodney, along with the Backman 
Parties and Backman-Stewart5 s president, Canyon Anderson, claiming that the Russells 
were required to pay more than the actual costs incurred D\ .: .• vuirci /h:r> : 
tniw licfauiis aiui : •*:*!'" ^v-:- !*. -\ base tliis claim on the fact that the Lundberg 
Parties received commissions from Backman-Stewart resulting from Mr. Lundberg's 
ownership interest in Backman-Stewart and the large amouni nl business lie brings l<» 
BacLmtn->io\*- ' ^ ; <*• l*;i^ th^ir claim on the fact that Rodney received a 
commission from the newspaper in which it published the notice of sale and that Mr. 
Lundberg owned an interest in Rodney. 
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The district court entered judgment in favor of the Lundberg Parties on the 
Russells' first four causes of action (breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, breach 
of contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing) pursuant to its 
Memorandum Decision entered September 30, 2002, and resulting Partial Summary 
Judgment for Lundberg Defendants entered October 30, 2002. 
The district court also entered judgment in favor of Rodney on those first four 
claims, as well as in favor of the Lundberg Parties and Rodney on the remaining causes of 
action (restitution based on mistake of fact, restitution based on mistake of law, tortious 
payment of money, unjust enrichment, wrongful collection, liability for intended 
consequences, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, violation of the Unfair 
Practices Act, and punitive damages) pursuant to its Memorandum Decision entered 
August 14, 2003, and resulting Order Granting the Lundberg Parties Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the Remaining Causes of Action in Plaintiffs' Complaint, Granting Rodney 
Service Co.'s Motion for Summary judgment, Granting the Backman Defendants' Motion 
for Judgment on the Pleadings, and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class entered 
on September 8, 2003. 
B. Statement of Facts, 
J. Scott Lundberg ["Mr. Lundberg"] is an attorney licensed to practice law in Utah. 
[R. 145, f 2.] Lundberg & Associates ["the Lundberg Firm"], a professional corporation 
owned by Mr. Lundberg, is a law firm. [R. 145, Tf 3.] Mr. Lundberg and the Lundberg 
Firm ["Lundberg Parties"] do real estate loan foreclosure work, including conducting, as 
4842-6971-1616.LU593.0Q! 5 
Ii iislee or as legal counsel for the trustee, non-judicial power of sale foreclosures on real 
property located in Utah. [R. 145, *§ 4; R. 906, f 3.] 
Rodney :> j r .•* . - ••-,
 t .i > i' J** *<' ;- * • " *-.rp ;!]<>>] tb:n w ^ organized 
(Mi Mu\ 1 2, 2000. Rodney's business involves the posting and publishing of notices of 
trustee's sale for trustees and attorneys in connection with their work in foreclosing trust 
deeds. . K . U ? : . ' •*. p.»r;.n. ,. •;" .1 *" j" ^\v.;r . \vr, :1bv 
]\h • indberg (89%) and his son, Derek Lundberg (11%). Derek Lundberg, as President 
of Rodney, handled the company's day-to-day operations during that time, i roni April 
22, 2002, to the present, Rodney has been o\\ IK-M ^I..\ * *;u - ^ - ' - I^TU'S 
family, and not by Mr. Lundberg [R. 655, f^ 5.] 
Before Rodney was formed, the Lundberg Finn paid individuals to post the notices 
of trustee's sale in connection wiu. LK_.; .or..\ii\m . hx:ru F- P \ r - : 
beneficiary under the trust deed being foreclosed or its servicing agent ["beneficiary"] the 
actual amount that it paid to those who posted the notices. [R. 662, f 3,] After Rodney 










 i^ >ii, r tc Lundberg Firm paid Rodney a flat fee of $65.00 for posting the 
notices for each foreclosure, and charged the beneficiary the actual amount that it paid to 
Rodney for handling the posting sen x ^ 
l Vf. »?v R onn-?v was formed, the Lundberg Firm arranged with newspapers to 
publish its notices of trustee's sale, and charged the beneficiary the actual amount that it 
paid to publish the notices, [K. ()t)2,^| :>,| , \\\cv Rodney '^  i\--v-. '•*•! ::i<:;vv.: '» 
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contracted with Rodney to handle the publishing of its foreclosure notices. In most cases 
Rodney charged the Lundberg Firm the same amount it was charged by the newspaper 
that published the notices, plus an administrative fee of $30.00 per foreclosure. When 
Rodney was able to negotiate with the Intermountain Commercial Record ["ICR"] a flat 
fee for publishing the notices placed by Rodney in ICR's newspaper, Rodney charged the 
Lundberg Firm the same flat fee that it paid to ICR, plus Rodney's administrative fee. 
Because of the large volume of work given by Rodney to ICR, Rodney later negotiated a 
commission arrangement with ICR, whereby ICR paid Rodney a commission each month 
based upon the amount of business referred. Thereafter, Rodney did not charge the 
Lundberg Firm an administrative fee for handling the publication of notices placed in 
ICR's newspaper. In all cases, the Lundberg Firm paid Rodney the amount that Rodney 
billed the Lundberg Firm for handling the publication of the foreclosure notices, the 
Lundberg Firm billed that same amount to the beneficiary for whom the foreclosure was 
being performed, and the beneficiary reimbursed the Lundberg Firm for that same 
amount. [R. 656-657, fflf 8-10; R. 662-663, f 6.] 
At no time has Mr. Lundberg or the Lundberg Firm received any compensation or 
commissions from Rodney in connection with the posting and publication services 
provided by Rodney. Mr. Lundberg's only remuneration from Rodney was his share of 
the profits earned by Rodney during the time that he was a part owner of the company. 
[R. 660, If 29; R. 663,17.] 
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Mr. Lundberg prefers to use one title company to provide the title work needed for 
his foreclosure work. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Mr. Lundberg used Backman-
Stewart Title Services Ltd. ["Backman-Stewart"]. In November 1991, Mr. Lundberg 
began using another local title company, but, by the mid-1990s, he again was using 
Backman-Stewart, although, as a licensed title insurance agent, he continued to do some 
of the title work himself. [R. 906, fflf 4-5; see R. 664, % 13.] 
In approximately 1997, Canyon Anderson ["Mr. Anderson"], the President of 
Backman Title Co. ["Backman Title"], the general partner of Backman-Stewart, 
approached Mr. Lundberg about becoming an owner of Backman-Stewart. [R. 664, If 12; 
R. 906, Tf 6.] Mr. Lundberg told Mr. Anderson that he would be interested if he could be 
satisfied that the Utah Insurance Commission would not have a problem with him, an 
attorney with a loan foreclosure practice, having an ownership interest in, and receiving 
remuneration from, the title company from which Mr. Lundberg and his firm purchased 
title products used in their foreclosure practice. [R. 906, f 6.] 
Mr. Anderson later informed Mr. Lundberg that he had been advised by the 
Insurance Commission that there was no reason that Mr. Lundberg could not be an owner 
in Backman-Stewart, and receive compensation for his ownership interest in the company 
and for referring work to the company, simply because he was an attorney and a licensed 
title agent authorized to do title work and collect premiums for that work. [R. 907, ^ f 7.] 
Mr. Lundberg thereupon purchased a 30% limited partnership interest in Backman-
Stewart, and became a director of Backman-Stewart. In late 2000 or early 2001, that 
4842-6971-1616.LU593.001 8 
interest was converted to a 15% ownership interest in Backman Title, and a 1% 
ownership interest in Backman-Stewart. [R. 664, ^ f 13; R. 907, f 7.] 
The Lundberg Firm often purchases a trustee's sale guarantee ["TSG"] from a title 
insurance company for use in its foreclosures. A TSG is similar to a preliminary title 
report or title commitment, in that it identifies the legal owner and the legal description of 
the property, and any liens or encumbrances on the property. A major difference between 
a TSG and a preliminary title report is the liability of the entity that issues the TSG or the 
title report if an error is made. If inaccurate information is contained in a TSG, the title 
insurance company that issues it will be liable for all damages incurred up to the amount 
of the lien being foreclosed. With a preliminary title report, only the local title company 
will be liable for any error in the report, and that liability generally is limited to the 
amount paid for the report. A TSG provides much greater protection to the trustee and 
the lender who are relying on the information contained therein, and, for that reason, are 
commonly used in the industry. [R. 663-664, ^ f 8.] 
The amount that Backman-Stewart and other title insurance companies in Utah 
charge for a TSG must be approved by the Utah Insurance Commission. [R. 664, ^ [ 9.] 
The amount that Backman-Stewart charges the Lundberg Firm for TSGs is at the rate 
approved by the Insurance Commission and is the same amount that it charges all other 
TSG purchasers. [R. 664, f 11.] When the Lundberg Firm purchases a TSG for a 
foreclosure that it is handling, the Lundberg Firm charges the beneficiary the same 
amount that it paid to the title insurance company for the TSG. [R. 664, ^ f 10.] 
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The practice in the title insurance industry is that if a TSG shows prior liens or 
encumbrances on the property being foreclosed for which releases should have been 
obtained when the loan was made, the title company issuing the TSG will have its 
employees, its law firm, or some other third party do the "title curative work" that is 
necessary to remove those liens and encumbrances from the record title. The title 
company usually does not charge the lender or trustee any additional amount for the title 
curative work but customarily bears that expense itself. [R. 907, Tf 8.] 
During 1998-2000, the years in which the events at issue in this lawsuit occurred, 
the Lundberg Parties performed legal services, such as title curative work, for Backman-
Stewart, and were compensated by Backman-Stewart for those services. [R. 665, f^ 14; R. 
907, ^9.] Backman-Stewart also paid commissions to the Lundberg Parties in 
recognition of Mr. Lundberg's ownership interest in Backman-Stewart and the large 
volume of business that the Lundberg Parties provided to Backman-Stewart. The 
commissions were not based upon a set percentage of the referred business. The 
Lundberg Parties did not receive commissions that were directly attributable to the 
amount paid by the Lundberg Firm to Backman-Stewart for a TSG obtained in connection 
with any particular foreclosure. [R. 665, f 15.] 
The commissions paid to the Lundberg Parties were determined periodically after 
Backman-Stewart subtracted from the total revenue that it received from the TSGs and 
other title products and services purchased by the Lundberg Parties the actual costs 
incurred by Backman-Stewart for the products and services purchased by the Lundberg 
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Parties, including the premiums paid to the underwriter, the cost of searching, examining 
and typing the TSGs, amounts for other overhead items, and a profit margin for 
Backman-Stewart. [R. 665, ^ 16.] Backman-Stewart did not sell the TSGs to the 
Lundberg Parties at less than actual cost, even if one considers the commissions that were 
paid to the Lundberg Parties. [R. 665, f 17.] 
In August 2000, to make certain that his relationship with Backman-Stewart would 
continue to have the approval of the Insurance Commission, Mr. Lundberg proposed to 
Backman-Stewart that the arrangement by which he would be compensated for his 
ownership interest in Backman-Stewart and for the large volume of work that he provided 
to Backman-Stewart be changed. Mr. Lundberg understood that Section 31 A-23-404(d) 
of the Insurance Code provided that a person may share compensation received for the 
issuance of a title insurance policy only to the extent that he "contributed to the search 
and examination of the title or other services connected with it." U.C.A. § 31A-23-
404(d). To ensure that there would be no question regarding their compliance with the 
statute, Mr. Lundberg proposed that he make the final review of, and sign on behalf of 
Backman-Stewart, TSGs initially prepared by Backman-Stewart personnel in connection 
with the Lundberg Parties' foreclosures and that the Lundberg Parties do the title curative 
work necessary to clear the titles on the properties that are the subject of those TSGs. 
Backman-Stewart agreed to the proposal, and a written contract was signed, 
acknowledging the agreement. [R. 907-908, ffi[ 10-11; R. 910-913.] 
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In late 2000 or early 2001, Mr. Anderson and Mr. Lundberg met with R. Peter 
Stevens ["Mr. Stevens"], the Assistant Commissioner of the Utah Insurance Commission, 
and discussed the nature of Mr. Lundberg's ownership interest in, and business 
relationship with, Backman-Stewart, and the compensation that Mr. Lundberg received 
from Backman-Stewart. [R. 908, f 12.] They answered Mr. Stevens' questions and 
provided him with the information he requested. [R. 908, ^ [ 13.] Neither Mr. Stevens nor 
anyone else from the Commission ever notified Mr. Lundberg that the Commission had 
any concern about his relationship with, or the remuneration that he received from, 
Backman-Stewart, or that such relationship or remuneration was improper or violated 
Utah law in any way. [R. 909,114.]1 
In August 1997, James R. Russell and Raylene Russell ["the Russells"] obtained a 
loan from One Stop Mortgage, Inc. ["One Stop"] to purchase a property at 1954 West 
Brynn Circle, West Jordan, Utah ["the Property"]. As part of that transaction, the 
Russells signed a promissory note ["Note"] and a deed of trust on the Property ["Trust 
!In 2002, subsequent to the events at issue in this litigation, the Utah Legislature 
amended the trust deed foreclosure statute to prohibit a trustee from receiving a 
commission or referral based fee for referring business, including title work or posting or 
publishing services, to a third party. U.C.A. § 57-1-21.5(4)(a) and (b)(2002). This 
amendment does not apply to fees received by a trustee for acting as legal counsel or for a 
nonpreferred participation in net profits based upon an ownership interest not otherwise 
prohibited by law. In March 2002, to comply with this change in the law, the manner by 
which compensation was paid to the Lundberg Parties by Backman-Stewart was changed. 
Since March 1, 2002, commissions have not been paid to the Lundberg Parties. Instead, 
Backman-Stewart has paid the Lundberg Firm a set fee each month to compensate it for 
the title curative work that it performs for Backman-Stewart, and Mr. Lundberg has 
received a monthly salary for his work as an officer of Backman-Stewart and for 
reviewing and signing TSGs and other title products. [R. 909, f 15.] 
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Deed"]. [R. 145, | 5.] As beneficiary under the Trust Deed, One Stop designated Mr. 
Lundberg to be the trustee, serving at its will and discretion. [R. 145, f 6.] 
The Lundberg Parties did not give any information, or make any representations, to 
the Russells, or have any contact with them, at or prior to the time the Russells executed 
the Trust Deed. In fact, the Lundberg Parties had no contacts or communications with the 
Russells whatsoever until after the Russells had defaulted on the Note and Trust Deed. 
[R. 146,17.] 
One Stop sold the loan, and assigned its interest in the Note and Trust Deed, to 
another lender, Aames Capital Corporation ["Aames"], a client of the Lundberg Parties. 
As the new beneficiary under the Trust Deed, Aames chose to have Mr. Lundberg 
continue serving as trustee. [R. 146, f 8.] 
The Russells defaulted on their payments on the Note in late 1997. [R. 146, «|f 9.] 
At Aames' request, the Lundberg Parties began the first foreclosure of the Trust Deed. 
Mr. Lundberg, as trustee, prepared a notice of default which was recorded with the Salt 
Lake County Recorder's Office and mailed to the Russells. [R. 146, ^ f 10.] When the 
Russells did not cure the default within three months, a notice of trustee's sale was mailed 
to the Russells and posted and published in accordance with Utah law. [R. 146, 11.] 
Rodney was not involved with the posting or publishing of this notice. [R. 657, If 13.] 
The Lundberg Firm purchased a TSG in connection with this first foreclosure for 
$767.00, and invoiced Aames for the $767.00 that it paid for the TSG. Aames 
reimbursed the Lundberg Firm for that amount. [R. 666, ^  23.] 
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The Lundberg Firm notified the Russells, at their request, of the amount they 
needed to pay to cure their default and reinstate their loan. This amount included all 
amounts owed on the Note, plus the actual fees and costs incurred by the beneficiary in 
connection with the foreclosure. [R. 666-667, f 24.] The Russells cured the default by 
paying that amount to the beneficiary. [R. 147, f 12.] 
In November 1998, the Russells again defaulted on the Note. [R. 147,113.] At 
Aames' request, the Lundberg Parties commenced a second foreclosure by recording and 
mailing to the Russells a new notice of default. [R. 147, ^  14.] When the Russells did not 
cure the default within three months, a new notice of trustee's sale was mailed to the 
Russells and posted and published in accordance with Utah law. [R. 147, % 15.] Rodney 
had no involvement with the posting or publication of this notice. [R. 147, f 15.] 
The Lundberg Firm purchased a TSG in connection with this second foreclosure 
from Backman-Stewart for $760.00, and invoiced Aames for the $760.00 that it paid for 
the TSG. Aames reimbursed the Lundberg Firm for that amount. [R. 667-668, Tf 30; R. 
671-682; R. 683.] 
The Lundberg Firm again notified the Russells, at their request, of the amount 
needed to cure the default and reinstate their loan. [R. 668, If 31; R. 684.] The Russells 
cured the default by paying the beneficiary the amounts owed on the Note, plus the fees 
and costs incurred by the beneficiary in connection with this foreclosure. [R. 147, f 16.] 
In March 2000, the Russells again defaulted on the Note [R. 148, f 17.], and, at 
Aames' request, the Lundberg Parties commenced a third foreclosure by recording and 
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mailing to the Russells a new notice of default. [R. 148, f 18] When the Russells did not 
cure the default within three months, a notice of trustee's sale was mailed to the Russells 
and posted and published in accordance with Utah law. [R. 148,119.] 
Rodney handled the posting of this notice for the Lundberg Firm. Rodney charged 
the Lundberg Firm $65.00 for the posting services, and the Lundberg Firm paid that 
amount to Rodney. The Lundberg Firm invoiced Aames for the $65.00 that it paid to 
Rodney, and Aames reimbursed the Lundberg Firm for that amount. [R. 658, f 19; R. 
669,1f36;R. 685.] 
Rodney also handled the publishing of the notice of trustee's sale for the Lundberg 
Firm. Rodney charged the Lundberg Firm $143.40 for publishing this notice, which was 
the same amount that Rodney was charged by ICR to print the notice in its newspaper. 
Rodney received a $30.00 commission from ICR, and therefore did not charge the 
Lundberg Firm its normal $30.00 administrative fee. The Lundberg Firm invoiced 
Aames for the $143.40 that it paid to Rodney, and Aames reimbursed the Lundberg Firm 
for that amount. [R. 659, ^  20; R. 669, ^  37; R. 685.] 
The Lundberg Firm purchased a TSG for this foreclosure from Backman-Stewart 
for $757.00, and invoiced Aames for that amount. Aames reimbursed the Lundberg Firm 
for the $757.00 that it had paid for the TSG. [R. 669-670, at ^  38; R. 686-698.] 
In September 2000, the Lundberg Firm notified Mr. Russell, at his request, of the 
amount that had to be paid to cure the default and reinstate the loan. [R. 670, ^ f 39; R. 
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699.] The Russells cured the default by paying Aames the amounts owed on the Note, 
including the fees and costs incurred by Aames in the foreclosure. [R. 670, f 40.] 
In all three foreclosures of the Russells5 Trust Deed, the Lundberg Firm invoiced 
the beneficiary for the fees and costs actually incurred and paid by the Lundberg Firm in 
connection with those foreclosures, and in each case those fees and costs were reimbursed 
by the beneficiary to the Lundberg Firm. [R. 148, If 21.] 
At no time did the Lundberg Parties serve as legal counsel for the Russells or have 
a confidential relationship of any kind with them. [[R. 148,123; R. 149, f 24.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Pursuant to the decisions of the Utah appellate courts, a trust deed trustee has 
limited statutory duties when conducting a non-judicial trust deed foreclosure, but, in the 
absence of a confidential or similar relationship with the trustors, does not owe the trustor 
a fiduciary or other independent duty. The undisputed evidence establishes that the 
Lundberg Parties did not have a confidential or similar relationship with the Russells. 
Thus, the Lundberg Parties owed no fiduciary duty to the Russells, and were entitled to 
judgment on the Russells' breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud claims. 
The undisputed evidence also established that Mr. Lundberg, as trustee, fully 
complied with his statutory duties to both the Russells and the beneficiary in foreclosing 
the Russells' Trust Deed. The Russells were not required to pay more than the actual 
costs incurred by the beneficiary to cure their defaults and reinstate their loan. The 
Lundberg Firm invoiced the beneficiary for the actual amounts that it paid to Backman-
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Stewart to purchase the TSGs and the actual amount that it paid to Rodney for the posting 
and publishing services that Rodney provided in connection with the third foreclosure. 
Although the Lundberg Parties received commissions from Backman-Stewart arising 
from Mr. Lundberg's ownership interest in the company and the large volume of business 
that the Lundberg Parties provided to Backman-Stewart, and Rodney received a 
commission from the newspaper that published the notice of sale relating to the Russells' 
property, the fact remains that the Russells only were charged for the actual costs incurred 
by the beneficiary, which were the actual amounts paid by the Lundberg Firm for those 
products and services. 
The Rules of Professional Conduct that apply to Mr. Lundberg and other attorney 
trustees precludes the Russells' argument that the trust deed foreclosure statute imposes 
an independent fiduciary duty on Mr. Lundberg, as a trustee, where his primary duty 
under the statute is to the beneficiary. 
The Lundberg Parties had no contractual relationship with the Russells, and, as a 
result, the district court properly entered judgment against the Russells on their breach of 
contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims. 
Rodney had no confidential or contractual relationship with the Russells, and 
therefore it was entitled to judgment on the Russells' fiduciary and contract claims. 
The evidence establishes that neither the Lundberg Parties nor Rodney made any 
false representations to the Russells, and therefore they were entitled to judgment on the 
Russells' fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims. 
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The Lundberg Parties and Rodney were not unjustly enriched by the Russells. or 
otherwise. 
The Russells lack standing to pursue their claim under the Utah Unfair Practices 
Act, where they are not in the business of selling TSGs and did not purchase TSGs from 
Backman-Stewart. In addition, there is no evidence of any violation by the Lundberg 
Parties of the UPA. Backman-Stewart charged the Lundberg Firm the same amount for 
the TSGs it purchased that it charged to other TSG buyers. There also is no evidence that 
the business relationship between the Lundberg Parties and Backman-Stewart created a 
monopoly or lessened competition in any way. 
The Russells failed to present any evidence that the Lundberg Parties or Rodney 
conspired to commit any unlawful action against the Russells. Accordingly, the Russells 
cannot prevail on their civil conspiracy claim. 
The Russells5 punitive damages claim fails as a matter of law where judgment was 
properly entered on all of the Russells' underlying claims. Moreover, the Russells have 
not presented any evidence that would support their punitive damages claim. 
The Russells have not argued on appeal that the district court erred in granting 
judgment against them on their claims for restitution based on mistake of fact or mistake 
of law, tortious payment of money, wrongful collection, or liability for intended 
consequences. That being the case, the Court should affirm the district court's decision 
granting judgment against the Russells on those claims. 
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ARGUMENTS 
I. THE LUNDBERG PARTIES DID NOT OWE A FIDUCIARY 
DUTY TO THE RUSSELLS, AND THE DISTRICT COURT 
PROPERLY DISMISSED THE RUSSELLS' BREACH OF 
FIDUCIARY DUTY AND CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD CLAIMS 
The Russells have no cause of action against the Lundberg Parties unless they can 
show a duty owed and breached. A duty arises only by statute, contract or, if a 
relationship exists which imposes an independent duty, by operation of law.2 Whether a 
duty exists is a question of law. AMS Salt Industries, Inc. v. Magnesium Corporation of 
America, 942 P.2d 315, 319 (Utah 1997). 
Mr. Lundberg, as trustee under the Russells5 Trust Deed, owed the Russells a 
statutory duty, albeit a limited one. Recognizing (but not admitting) that Mr. Lundberg 
fulfilled his statutory duty, the Russells argue that they had a confidential or contractual 
relationship with the Lundberg Parties which created for the Lundberg Parties a fiduciary 
duty, and that the Lundberg Parties breached that fiduciary duty. The undisputed facts 
demonstrate, however, that there was no such contractual or confidential relationship 
between the parties, and the Lundberg Parties owed no fiduciary duty to the Russells. 
The Russells have repeatedly alleged - without any factual basis whatsoever - that 
the Lundberg Parties and Rodney engaged in dishonest, fraudulent and illegal conduct by 
accepting "kickbacks" from Backman-Title and the Intermountain Commercial Record 
and by requiring defaulting trustors such as the Russells to pay excessive fees and costs to 
2See Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, \ 43 ("Contractual duties exist 
by mutual agreement of the parties, while tort duties exist by imposition of society"). 
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cure their defaults and reinstate their loans. Cutting through the slanderous rhetoric and 
false accusations in which the Russells clothe their allegations, what the Russells actually 
are arguing is that a trust deed trustee, accepting and performing the duties and 
responsibilities statutorily imposed, may not have a pecuniary interest in the businesses 
that provide logistic support for the performance of those duties. They offer no reason 
why that should be the case. Their position is not supported by any Utah statute or 
appellate decision, and is without merit. 
A. Under Utah Law, A Trustee Does Not Owe A Fiduciary Duty To The Trustor 
In The Absence Of A Confidential Or Similar Relationship Between Them, 
The Russells incorrectly state that the district court determined that Mr. Lundberg 
did not owe them any duty of any kind. In its Memorandum Decision dated September 
30, 2002, the district court correctly observed that there were procedural duties owing 
under the trust deed foreclosure statute and that Mr. Lundberg fully complied with those 
statutory duties. [R. 285.] What the district court did do was reject the Russells' 
argument that Mr. Lundberg owed a fiduciary duty to the Russells simply because he was 
the trustee under their Trust Deed. [R. 284.] 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-1-19 to -36 govern the rights, powers and duties of trustors, 
beneficiaries and trustees under a trust deed. In two Utah Supreme Court cases, the duties 
owed by a trustee to a trustor were addressed. In both cases, the Court held that a 
fiduciary duty was owed by the trustee to the trustor only as a consequence of a 
confidential relationship existing between them at the time the trust deed was executed. 
Those cases, as well as a recent decision of this Court, clarify the circumstances that must 
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be established in order for a trustee to have a fiduciary duty to a trustor - circumstances 
not present in this case. 
In Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978), the Supreme Court first 
addressed whether a bank serving as both beneficiary and trustee under a trust deed had 
misled the trustor, at the time the trust deed was executed, regarding the contents of the 
instrument, by including two lots, rather than one, in the trust deed.3 
The Supreme Court noted that the trustee had "certain clear statutory duties" with 
regard to "(1) advertisement of the sale (Sec. 57-1-25) and (2) deference to the Blodgetts' 
preference as to the joint or sequential sale of the tracts (Sec. 57-1-27)," and is required to 
exercise "reasonable diligence to protect the trustor's interests in the procedures incident 
to the public sale." Id. at 303. The Court stated that a trustee also has a duty to "act with 
reasonable diligence and good faith on [the trustor's] behalf consistent with his primary 
obligation to assure the payment of the secured debt" and "a duty to treat the trustor fairly 
and in accordance with a high punctilio of honor." Id. at 302, 303. 
3The Blodgetts, owners of two lots, agreed with their tenant to pledge one lot as 
security for a bank loan the tenant was obtaining. The tenant obtained the loan from a 
bank with whom the Blodgetts had been long-time customers and which previously had 
taken from the Blodgetts a security interest in both lots to secure other Blodgett loans. 
Unbeknownst to the Blodgetts, the bank prepared the trust deed to include both lots as 
security for the tenant's loan, rather than only the one lot as the Blodgetts intended. Thus, 
the trust deed executed by the Blodgetts erroneously pledged both lots to the bank as 
security for the tenant's loan. The tenant-borrower ultimately defaulted, and the bank 
appointed a substitute trustee and caused both lots to be sold at foreclosure sale. The 
successor trustee failed to give the Blodgetts proper notice of the foreclosure sale as 
required by statute. Nevertheless, the sale went forward and, without the Blodgetts' 
knowledge, both lots were sold at the trustee's sale. Blodgett, 590 P.2d at 300-301. 
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Blodgett clarifies that, while a trustee has certain statutory duties to a trustor, the 
trustee does not owe a fiduciary duty to the trustor in the absence of a confidential 
relationship. In Blodgett, the Court recognized that the bank, as both trustee and 
beneficiary, had a fiduciary duty to the Blodgetts, not because the bank was the trustee 
under the trust deed, but because the bank had a confidential relationship with the 
Blodgetts arising out of their long-standing business relationship and the trust reposed by 
the Blodgetts in the bank. In describing this confidential relationship, the Court stated: 
If the circumstances are such that the defendant could exercise 
extraordinary influence over the plaintiff and the defendant was or should 
have been aware the plaintiff reposed trust and confidence in the defendant 
and reasonably relied on defendant's guidance, then the parties are said to 
be in "confidential relationship" . . . . Id. at 302. 
The Court determined that, at the time the trust deed was prepared by the bank and 
executed by the Blodgetts, the bank had a confidential relationship with the Blodgetts and 
had committed constructive fraud by not disclosing to the Blodgetts that both lots were 
included in the trust deed. 
In First Security Bank of Utah v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253 (Utah 1989), 
the Supreme Court addressed the "duty" of a trust deed trustee who failed to comply with 
the statutory requirements for a trust deed foreclosure by sending out a notice of default 
containing an inaccurate description of the property being foreclosed.4 
4Banberry purchased property from Kimball and executed a trust deed in favor of 
Kimball. Kimball later subordinated his interest in the trust deed in favor of the bank. 
After Banberry developed part of the property, Kimball reconveyed to Banberry some of 
the pledged parcels. When Banberry defaulted on its loan, Kimball appointed a substitute 
trustee under the trust deed and initiated foreclosure. The trustee recorded and mailed to 
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The issue faced by the Court was whether the trustee had breached a fiduciary duty 
owed to the trustor. Id. at 1256. The Court, citing the Blodgett case, stated: 
Upon default, the trustee has power to sell the property to satisfy the 
trustor's debt to the beneficiary. The existence of the trust itself creates a 
duty between the trustee and the beneficiary. But the trustee's duty to 
the beneficiary does not imply that the trustee may ignore that trustor's 
rights and interests. Obviously, a trust deed trustee may not scheme to 
defraud a trustor. And in cases where a trustor reposes its trust or 
confidence in the trustee and relies on the trustee's guidance or where 
the trustee could exercise extraordinary influence over the trustor or 
where the trustee stands in a dominant position to the trustor, it is 
possible that the trustee is bound by a fiduciary duty to act in the 
interest of the trustor. In short, the existence of a duty between the 
trustee and the trustor may be implied by the factual situation of a 
particular case. In this instance, however, there is no evidence of fraud 
or a relationship that would create a fiduciary duty. The trustee did not 
breach a duty to the trustor. Id. (internal citations omitted)(emphasis 
added). 
In both Blodgett and Banberry, the Supreme Court recognized that a trustee bears 
only a limited statutory duty. Any other duty owing to a trustor, such as a fiduciary duty, 
is dependent upon the existence of a confidential relationship between the trustee and the 
trustor, where the trustee stands in a dominant position to the trustor and exercises 
extraordinary influence over the trustor at the time the trust deed is executed. 
This Court, in the case of Five F, L.L.C. v. Heritage Savings Bank, 2003 UT App 
373, 81 P.3d 105, also addressed a claim of fiduciary duty purportedly owed by a trustee 
Banberry and purchasers of condos on the reconveyed property a notice of default, which 
contained a faulty property description including all of the original property rather than 
excluding the portion that had been reconveyed previously. Although an amended notice 
excluding the reconveyed property was recorded once the error was discovered, Banberry 
claimed that the initial notice caused it damage, and sued the trustee, alleging a breach of 
fiduciary duty. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d at 1255-1256. 
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to a trustor.5 The trial court found that because Heritage was both the beneficiary and 
trustee it owed a fiduciary duty to the trustor, Five F. In granting Heritage's motion for 
directed verdict, the trial court ruled that despite the fiduciary duty owed by Heritage to 
Five F, Heritage could not be held liable where it fulfilled its obligations under the trust 
deed and adhered to the requirements of the statute. Five F} 2003 UT App 373, ff 1, 10. 
On appeal, this Court determined that whether Heritage had an actionable fiduciary 
duty depended on whether the following circumstances or criteria declared by Banberry 
Crossing existed: (1) where a trustor reposes its trust or confidence in the trustee and 
relies on the trustee's guidance, (2) where the trustee could exercise extraordinary 
influence over the trustor, and (3) where the trustee stands in a dominant position to the 
trustor. Five F, 2003 UT App 373, f 17. 
As established in Banberry Crossing and Five F, duties beyond those specifically 
required of a trustee by statute do not arise absent a confidential or other similar 
relationship between the trustor and the trustee. Where no such relationship existed 
between the Russells and the Lundberg Parties, no fiduciary duty was owed. 
B. Where There Was No Confidential Relationship Between The Lundberg 
Parties And The Russells. No Fiduciary Duty Was Owed. 
In Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982), 
the Court said: 
5Five F obtained a loan from Heritage secured by a deed of trust in which Heritage 
was both the trustee and the beneficiary. When Five F defaulted on the loan, Heritage 
foreclosed as permitted by statute. Five F sued for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of 
contract and unjust enrichment. Five F, 2003 UT App 373, ff 2-9. 
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A fiduciary or confidential relationship may be created by contract or by 
circumstances where equity will imply a higher duty in a relationship 
because the trusting party has been induced to relax the care and vigilance 
he would ordinarily exercise. In such a case, the evidence must 
demonstrate the placement of trust and reliance such that the nature of the 
relationship is clear. 
The undisputed evidence in this case establishes that there was no confidential 
relationship between the parties at the time the Trust Deed was signed. The Russells were 
not acquainted with, or clients of, the Lundberg Parties. The Russells had never spoken 
to Mr. Lundberg or his firm. The Lundberg Parties did not provide any information, or 
make any representations, to the Russells at that time. Mr. Lundberg was selected by the 
beneficiary, and not by the Russells, to be the trustee under the Trust Deed. The Russells 
did not place any trust in, or otherwise rely on, the Lundberg Parties in any way. 
There also was no confidential relationship between the parties during the three 
foreclosures of the Trust Deed. The Russells had no personal, social or professional 
relationship with the Lundberg Parties, before, during or after the foreclosures. Although 
the Lundberg Parties provided information to the Russells regarding the amounts they 
would have to pay to cure their defaults, such a ministerial act does not create or 
constitute a confidential relationship between them. The Russells did not repose trust or 
confidence in the Lundberg Parties or rely on their guidance in any way. The Lundberg 
Parties did not exercise extraordinary influence over the Russells and did not stand in a 
dominant position over them. 
The foreclosures were initiated by the beneficiary, not by the Lundberg Parties. 
The fact that Mr. Lundberg performed his statutory duties in connection with the 
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foreclosures did not create a confidential relationship between the parties. Yet the 
Russells rest their notion of confidential relationship on just such a feeble connection. 
In view of the complete absence of any confidential relationship between the 
Russells and the Lundberg Parties such as was found in Blodgett, and the absence of any 
facts to establish the Banberry Crossing criteria articulated in Five F, this Court should 
affirm the district court's decision that the Lundberg Parties owed no fiduciary duty to the 
Russells, and that the Lundberg Parties were entitled to judgment on the Russells' breach 
of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud claims as a matter of law. 
C. The Undisputed Evidence Establishes That Mr. Lundberg Complied With His 
Statutory Duties In Foreclosing The Russells9 Trust Deed In Accordance 
With The Utah Trust Deed Foreclosure Statute. 
1. A Trustee's Duties are Limited by Statute and Mr. Lundberg Complied 
With All of Those Statutory Duties. 
The primary duty owed by a trustee of a trust deed is to assure the payment of the 
secured debt to the beneficiary. Blodgett, 590 P.2d at 303. The very definition of 
beneficiary lays the foundation for this understanding. The term "beneficiary" is defined 
by the statute to mean the person named or otherwise designated in the trust deed as the 
person for whose benefit a trust deed is given. . . ." U.C.A. § 57-1-19(1). Further, § 57-
1-20 states: "Transfers in trust of real property may be made to secure the performance of 
an obligation of the trustor or any other person named in the trust deed to a beneficiary." 
The trustee is the steward of the trust deed for the benefit of the beneficiary. See U.C.A. 
§§57-1-19(4) and 57-1-20. 
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In addition to the "benefit," or the security for payment and performance of the 
trustor's obligations, the beneficiary under the trust deed has significant statutory rights 
and powers under the trust deed foreclosure statute. For example, § 57-1-22(1) provides: 
The beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for 
record in the office of the county recorder . . . a substitution of trustee. . . . 
The beneficiary may, by express provision in the substitution of trustee, 
ratify and confirm action taken on the beneficiary's behalf by the new 
trustee prior to the recording of the substitution of trustee. 
And, when it comes to the manner of foreclosure, § 57-1-23 grants the following 
authority to the beneficiary: 
. . .after a breach of an obligation for which the trust property is conveyed 
as security; or, at the option of the beneficiary, a trust deed may be 
foreclosed in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages 
on real property. The power of sale may be exercised by the trustee without 
express provision therefor in the trust deed. [Emphasis added.] 
As shown above, it is the beneficiary that commissions and invokes the 
performance of the trustee's duties. Section 57-1-33. l(l)(a) similarly provides: "When 
an obligation secured by a trust deed has been satisfied, the trustee shall, upon written 
request by the beneficiary, reconvey the trust property." [Emphasis added.] It is the 
beneficiary that must authorize the trustee to reconvey the trust property to the trustor. 
Perhaps the most telling articulation of the true statutory relationship between trustee and 
beneficiary is in § 57-l-27(l)(a): "The trustee may bid for the beneficiary." The trustee 
cannot act independently. The trustee does not act at the behest of the trustor. 
While the trust deed foreclosure statutes are replete with references to the 
relationship and rights and duties between trustee and beneficiary, the same cannot be 
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said regarding the relationship between trustee and trustor. Nevertheless, a trustee clearly 
does have certain statutory duties which first arise at the time of the trustor's default.6 In 
performing these statutory duties, the trustee must act with reasonable diligence and good 
faith with regard to the trustor, consistent with the trustee's primary obligation to assure 
the payment of the secured debt. No further duty in the trustee does or can exist unless 
the same has arisen as a consequence of some confidential or other extraordinary 
relationship between the trustor and the trustee. 
The Russells defaulted three times on their loan obligation. They cured their 
default on each occasion. The conduct about which they complain against the Lundberg 
Parties arose after each default, but prior to any sale of the Property. Consequently, the 
only statutory duty performed by Mr. Lundberg was the giving of the applicable notices 
on the three different occasions. See U.C.A. § 57-1-26(2). The Russells do not challenge 
the validity of the notices. Thus, none of the trustee's statutory duties are relevant to this 
case and Mr. Lundberg has breached no statutory duty. 
The Russells cite at footnote 12 to Concepts, Inc. v. First Security Realty Services, 
Inc., 743 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1987), a trust deed foreclosure case.7 The court in Concepts 
6Those duties are to properly give the necessary notice of default and notice of sale 
(§ 57-1-26(2), (3) and (4)); to assure that the property is sold at foreclosure sale to the 
highest bidder (§ 57-1-27(1)); to accept any direction from the trustor as to the order in 
which multiple parcels will be sold (§ 57-1-27(1)); and, finally, to make proper 
distribution of the proceeds of sale (§ 57-1-29). 
7In Concepts, the beneficiary, who was the only bidder at the foreclosure sale, 
purchased the property at the sale. When the beneficiary failed to pursue its claim for a 
deficiency judgment within the statutory three month period, he scheduled a second 
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held that the right to set aside a foreclosure sale was limited to circumstances when "the 
interests of the debtor were sacrificed or there was some attendant fraud or unfair 
dealing." Concepts, 141 P.2d at 1160. The Concepts case relies on the statutory 
protections afforded to the trustor under Title 57, Chapter 1. The Lundberg Parties 
recognize the existence of those statutory protections, but those protections are not called 
into play under the undisputed facts of this case, and are not at issue here. There was no 
foreclosure sale of the Russells' Property and the Russells' interests, which were 
protected by statute, were never in peril. 
The Russells also cite in footnote 12 of their brief to Jones v. Johnson, 761 P.2d 37 
(Utah App. 1988),8 in support of the proposition that the procedural requirements for a 
trustee's sale are intended to protect the debtor/trustor. The Lundberg Parties have 
asserted all along that a trustee owes to the trustor the limited duties outlined in the trust 
deed foreclosure statute.9 
foreclosure sale of the property, based on a typographical error in the original notice. The 
trustor then brought a declaratory judgment action to obtain an order declaring that the 
first sale was valid, notwithstanding the error in the earlier notice, and that the trustee was 
precluded from conducting a second sale of the property. Concepts, 743 P.2d at 1158-59. 
8In Jones, the trustor sued to set aside the foreclosure sale, alleging that the 
contract creating the trust deed was unconscionable. Jones, 761 P.2d at 38. The Russells 
do not assert that the underlying trust deed or any contract by which it was created was 
unconscionable. Moreover, there was no foreclosure sale of the Russells' Property. 
9The Russells also cite First Security Bank v. Felger, 658 F. Supp. 175, 183 (D. 
Utah 1987), for their proposition that "the purpose of the trust deed foreclosure statute is 
to protect the borrower." However, Felger has no application to this case. Felger 
involved two liens held by the same entity against two obligors on the same property and 
merely discusses the one-action rule and merger doctrine. 
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2. The Russells Have Misconstrued the Language of § 57-1-31(1) to Imply 
a Non-existent Duty Owing by the Lundberg Parties to the Russells. 
The Russells claim that the Lundberg Parties were not honest with them and did 
not follow the foreclosure statute when they purportedly charged the Russells inflated 
amounts, in excess of the actual costs incurred in the foreclosures, to cure their defaults 
and reinstate the loan. That claim is without merit. 
The Lundberg Parties purchased the TSGs from Backman Stewart and on one 
occasion used Rodney to post and publish the notice of sale for the foreclosures of the 
Russells' Trust Deed. There certainly is nothing illegal or improper with doing so, as a 
trustee is not required to perform personally each task associated with the foreclosure. To 
perform his statutory duties, a trustee must obtain a TSG or title report regarding the 
property being foreclosed to check the title and see what liens and encumbrances are on 
the property. The trustee is not required to personally do that title work, but may pay a 
title company to do so. The trustee also is not required to personally post and publish the 
notices, but may hire a sheriff, constable, or other person to do so.10 That the Lundberg 
Firm at one time handled the functions associated with posting and publishing the notices 
of sale did not preclude it from later contracting with Rodney to perform those functions. 
The basis for the Russells' claim ostensibly is that the costs for the TSGs and for 
posting and publishing the notices of sale that they were required to pay to cure their 
10In the 2001 amendments to the trust deed foreclosure statute, the legislature made 
it clear that a trustee may use "the services of others for publication, posting, marketing, 
or advertising the sale;. . ." U.C.A. § 57-l-21.5(2)(b)(2001). The Russells' assertion that 
a trustee must personally manage the posting and publication function is without merit. 
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defaults were more than the costs actually incurred by the Lundberg Parties for those 
items. The Russells do not contend, however, that the Lundberg Firm did not incur the 
costs for the TSGs and for posting and publishing that it claimed to incur, that the 
Lundberg Firm did not invoice the beneficiary for the actual amounts that it paid for those 
products and services, or that the beneficiary did not reimburse the Lundberg Firm for 
those costs. Instead, the Russells argue that because of Mr. Lundberg's ownership 
interest in Backman Stewart and in Rodney, and the compensation derived therefrom, he 
was obligated to reduce the amounts that the Russells were required to pay to cure their 
defaults by some unstated amount that would represent the dividend, commission or other 
financial benefit received by the Lundberg Parties. The Russells do not say what the 
amount of the discount should be or even how it should or would be calculated. They do 
not contend that Mr. Lundberg's interest in Backman-Stewart and in Rodney was illegal 
or that for some other reason he should not have maintained those interests. The Russells 
provide neither statutory nor case law support for their position. Perhaps more 
importantly, they do not claim nor purport to show that the amounts charged to and paid 
by them were in excess of what was reasonable and proper for the foreclosure services 
provided. It is undisputed that the costs the Lundberg Parties incurred incident to the 
foreclosure process was the exact amount that the Russells were required to pay to the 
beneficiary to cure their defaults. 
The Russells argue that § 57-1-31(1) necessarily requires that the amount of the 
costs paid by the Russells to cure their defaults was to have been discounted to reflect 
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amounts anticipated or actually received by the Lundberg Parties from Backman Stewart 
and Rodney. Such an argument misconstrues the clear language of that provision. 
The statutory language upon which the Russells rely does not apply to costs and 
expenses "actually incurred" by the trustee. Rather, the statute states that in order to 
reinstate the trust deed, the trustor "may pay to the beneficiary or the beneficiary's 
successor in interest the entire amount then due under the terms of the trust deed 
(including costs and expenses actually incurred in enforcing the terms of the obligation, 
or trust deed, and the trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred).. . ." U.C.A. § 57-
1-31(1) (emphasis added). 
The term "actually incurred," as used in § 57-1-31(1), applies to costs and 
expenses "actually incurred" by the beneficiary, not the trustee. The question, therefore, 
is: what expense has the beneficiary "actually incurred"? Here, it is undisputed that the 
beneficiary incurred and paid the costs for the TSGs and the posting and publishing 
services that the Lundberg Firm had incurred and paid for its benefit. 
Chapter 1 of Title 57 imposes no duty on the trustee to account to the trustor for 
fees and costs charged to the foreclosing beneficiary but instead merely limits the 
beneficiary's recovery to only such fees and costs "actually incurred."11 
1
 furthermore, if the trustor does not cure the default, the foreclosure proceeds to 
sale. The trustee then applies the sale proceeds in accordance with § 57-1-29. The 
proceeds are applied first to trustee's fees and associated attorneys' fees. See U.C.A. 
§ 57-1-29. This is true whether or not the remaining sale proceeds are sufficient to satisfy 
the trustor's obligation. It is the foreclosing beneficiary who has the duty to pay its 
trustee and attorneys' fees. The trustor is, in turn, liable to the beneficiary for such fees 
pursuant to the statute and the terms of the trust deed. 
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3. Attorneys, Acting as Trustees, Would Violate the Conflict of Interest 
Provision of the Rules of Professional Conduct If the Performance of 
Their Duties Imposed by the Trust Deed Foreclosure Statute Created a 
Fiduciary Duty Owing to Both the Beneficiary and the Trustor, 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that an attorney cannot serve two masters in 
directly conflicting roles. See Walker v. Walker, 707 P.2d 110, 113 (Utah 1985). And yet, 
violation of that fundamental principle is precisely what adoption of the Russells' 
arguments regarding the Lundberg Parties' obligations to the Russells would require. 
Section 57-1-21 permits members of the Utah State Bar and other specified entities 
with credentials of trustworthiness to act as "trustees." U.C.A. § 57-1-21; see also 
Blodgett, 590 P.2d at 302. Mr. Lundberg is authorized to be a trust deed trustee by reason 
of his membership in the Utah State Bar. But, as a member of the bar and a practicing 
attorney, he is bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct that are promulgated and 
approved by the Utah Supreme Court. Rule 1.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct provides that, with limited exceptions, "[a] lawyer shall not represent a client if 
the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client," and "[a] lawyer 
shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by 
the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person or by the lawyer's own 
interest." Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.7. 
An attorney cannot serve two masters in directly conflicting roles, but facilitating a 
trust deed foreclosure with automatically concurrent duties to both the beneficiary and 
trustor, as the Russells assert, would do just that. A trustee's duties are not called into 
play until a trustor either fully performs the obligations owed to the beneficiary and 
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secured by the trust deed or breaches those obligations. If a breach occurs, the trustee 
then begins foreclosure proceedings against the trustor, clearly detrimental to the trustor's 
interests. The beneficiary and trustor are in conflicting positions, and serving both would 
put the attorney trustee in directly conflicting roles. 
Certainly the law does not and cannot contemplate a trustee owing a fiduciary duty 
simultaneously to both the beneficiary and the trustor.12 If and when a fiduciary duty is 
found to be owing to a trustor, as declared by both Banberry Crossing and Five F, such a 
duty must be predicated upon a confidential or similar relationship existing with the 
trustor either at the time the trust deed is executed or later during its foreclosure. 
Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d at 1256; Five F, 2003 UT App.373, \ 17. The directive in 
Blodgett to "treat the trustor fairly and in accordance with a high punctilio of honor," 
Blodgett, 590 P.2d at 302, does not subordinate an attorney's foremost obligation to avoid 
conflicts of interest, but necessarily addresses and measures the manner in which a 
trustee's statutory duty is to be performed. Any other rule would render all attorneys 
12In Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980), a case involving the 
question of whether, as a matter of law, a real estate agent can hold a fiduciary duty to 
both the seller and buyer, the Court said "no!" The Court went on to say that a real estate 
agent is required to meet standards of honesty, integrity, truthfulness, reputation, and 
competency." The Russells have made a similar assertion that there is, as a matter of law, 
a fiduciary relationship between a trustee and a trustor to a trust deed. Under Utah law, 
this assertion is simply untenable. As stated by the Court in Dugan, "[t]hough not 
occupying a fiduciary relationship with prospective purchasers, a real estate agent 
hired by the vendor is expected to be honest, ethical, and competent and is answerable at 
law for breaches of his or her statutory duty to the public." Id, (emphasis added). If a 
real estate agent cannot have a fiduciary duty to both parties to a transaction, certainly an 
attorney as trustee under a deed of trust may not do so absent some extraordinary 
relationship of trust and confidence. 
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unable to fulfill the duties of trustee, in direct contravention of the plain language of 
U.C.A. §57-1-21. 
II. MR. LUNDBERG HAD NO CONTRACTUAL DUTY 
TO THE RUSSELLS BECAUSE THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR A VALID CONTRACT HAVE NOT BEEN MET 
The Russells' third and fourth causes of action are based upon theories of contract 
law. However, the undisputed evidence establishes that the Russells had no contractual 
relationship with the Lundberg Parties. The Russells have failed to present evidence 
establishing any agreement between them, as trustors, and Mr. Lundberg, as trustee. 
Moreover, the Russells' claim that they had a contractual relationship with Mr. Lundberg 
fails due to lack of consideration and a lack of privity. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held: "In determining whether the parties created an 
enforceable contract, a court should consider all preliminary negotiations, offers, and 
counteroffers and interpret the various expressions of the parties for the purpose of 
deciding whether the parties reached agreement on complete and definite terms." Nunley 
v. Westates Casing Services, Inc., 989 P.2d 1077, 1084 (Utah 1999). In this case there 
were no preliminary negotiations, no offers, no counteroffers, no acceptances, and no 
expression by either Mr. Lundberg or the Russells that they had reached any agreement. 
As the evidence established, Mr. Lundberg had no contact with the Russells at or prior to 
the time the Trust Deed was executed. Mr. Lundberg did not sign the Trust Deed. 
A basic concept of contract law is that there must be consideration, which is an 
"act or promise, bargained for and given in exchange for a promise." Resource 
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Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1036 (Utah 
1985). Here, Mr. Lundberg, as trustee, neither performed an act or promise for the 
benefit of the Russells nor was the recipient of any act or promise performed by the 
Russells. There is no consideration to support any purported contract between the parties. 
There also is no privity of contract. Privity of contract is "[t]hat connection or 
relationship which exists between two or more contracting parties." Blacks Law 
Dictionary, 6th Ed. In this case it is clear that there is a contract between the beneficiary 
and the trustor, and between the beneficiary and the trustee. However, there is no 
contract between the trustee and the trustor and, therefore, no contractual duty is owed by 
Mr. Lundberg to the Russells. 
Finally, the Russells' claim for breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
must fail because there can be no such claim absent a valid contract. "[UJnder the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, each party impliedly promises that it will not 
intentionally or purposely do anything [that] will destroy or injure the other party's right 
to receive the fruits of the contract." Brown v. Moore, 973 P.2d 950, 954 (Utah 1998). In 
this case there is no contract and, consequently, there can be no breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF RODNEY ON THE RUSSELLS' FIDUCIARY DUTY, 
CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD AND CONTRACT CLAIMS 
The Russells never had any communications or contacts, or any confidential 
relationship, with Rodney. The Russells have not presented any evidence that would 
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establish a statutory, contractual or fiduciary duty owed by Rodney to the Russells. 
Accordingly, the district court properly granted judgment in favor of Rodney on the 
Russells' claims for breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, breach of contract, and 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT 
THE LUNDBERG PARTIES AND RODNEY WERE ENTITLED 
TO JUDGMENT ON THE RUSSELLS5 OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION 
A. To Defeat A Summary Judgment Motion. The Russells Must Produce 
Admissible Evidence Showing That There Is A Genuine Issue Of Material 
Fact Which The Russells Have Failed To Do. 
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224, 226 (Utah 
1983); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 411 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998). 
The Russells have the ultimate burden of proving all elements of their causes of 
action. See Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994). As part of 
their motion for summary judgment, the Lundberg Parties and Rodney, as the moving 
parties, have the initial burden of showing that there is an absence of evidence to support 
the Russells' claims. See Celotex, All U.S. at 323; Adler, 144 F.3d at 670-71. They may 
make their prima facie showing simply by pointing out to the court a lack of evidence on 
an essential element of each of the Russells' claims. See Adler, \AA F.3d at 671. 
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Once the Lundberg Parties and Rodney have carried their initial burden, the 
Russells have an affirmative duty to go beyond the pleadings and set forth specific facts, 
with affidavits or other materials allowed by Rule 56(e). See Thayne, 874 P.2d at 124; 
D&L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989); Adler, 144 F.3d at 671; Utah R. 
Civ. P. 56(e). The Russells may not rest upon the mere allegations in their pleadings, but 
must present admissible evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Hall, 
671 P.2d at 226; Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979); Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In the absence of such evidence, summary 
judgment may be entered. See D&L Supply, 775 P.2d at 421. 
As set forth hereinafter, the Lundberg Parties and Rodney carried their burden of 
showing the lack of evidence to support the Russells' claims and established that they are 
entitled to judgment on those claims as a matter of law. Where the Russells failed to 
produce admissible evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, the district court 
properly granted summary judgment against the Russells on their remaining claims. 
B. The Russells Failed To Present Admissible Evidence Establishing Their Claim 
Of Fraud Against The Lundberg Parties And Rodney, 
For the Russells to prevail on their fraud claim, they must prove, among other 
things, that the Lundberg Parties or Rodney made a representation concerning a presently 
existing material fact, which was false and which the Lundberg Parties or Rodney knew 
was false, for the purpose of inducing the Russells to act upon it, and that the Russells in 
fact did rely upon it and were thereby induced to act to their injury and damage. Pace v. 
Parrish, 247 P.2d 273, 274-75 (Utah 1952). A person cannot be liable for fraud unless he 
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made the false representations himself, authorized someone to make them for him, or 
participated in the misrepresentation in some way. Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 
P.2d 785, 792 (Utah App. 1987). 
The evidence presented establishes that neither the Lundberg Parties nor Rodney 
made any false representation to the Russells. Mr. Lundberg and Rodney never spoke to 
the Russells. The only representations made by employees of the Lundberg Firm to the 
Russells accurately set forth the amounts that the Russells needed to pay to the 
beneficiary to cure the defaults and reinstate their loan. In particular, the amounts that the 
Russells were required to pay to the beneficiary for the TSGs and the posting and 
publication costs accurately reflected the actual amounts that the beneficiary, as well as 
the Lundberg Firm, paid for those items. 
Where the Russells have failed to present evidence of a false representation being 
made by the Lundberg Parties or Rodney, as well as evidence of the other elements that 
are required to prove, the district court properly granted judgment in favor of the 
Lundberg Parties and Rodney on the Russells' claim for fraud. 
C. The Russells Failed To Present Admissible Evidence Establishing Their 
Negligent Misrepresentation Claim Against The Lundberg Parties And 
Rodney. 
To prevail on a claim for negligent misrepresentation, the Russells must prove that 
they were injured by their reasonable reliance upon the careless or negligent 
misrepresentation of a material fact by the Lundberg Parties or Rodney. See Maack v. 
Resource Design & Construction, Inc., 875 P.2d 570, 576-77 (Utah App. 1994). Again, 
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given the lack of any admissible evidence that the Lundberg Parties and Rodney made a 
false representation to the Russells, the district court properly granted judgment in favor 
of the Lundberg Parties and Rodney on the Russells' negligent misrepresentation claim. 
D. The District Court Correctly Ruled That the Russells Cannot Prevail On 
Their Unjust Enrichment Claim As A Matter Of Law. 
To prevail on their claim for unjust enrichment, the Russells must present 
admissible evidence sufficient to establish the following three elements. First, there must 
be a benefit conferred on one person by another. Second, the conferee must appreciate or 
have knowledge of the benefit. Finally, there must be "the acceptance or retention by the 
conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the 
conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value." American Towers Owners 
Ass'n, Inc. v. CCIMechanical, 930 P.2d 1182, 1192 (Utah 1996); Berrettv. Stevens, 690 
P.2d 553, 557 (Utah 1994). 
The Russells are unable to satisfy these three elements. There is no evidence that 
the Russells conferred any benefit on the Lundberg Parties or Rodney whatsoever. It was 
the beneficiary, and not the Russells, who reimbursed the Lundberg Firm for the actual 
costs advanced by it in connection with the Russell foreclosures, and it was the Lundberg 
Firm, not the Russells, that paid Rodney. 
The Lundberg Parties' receipt of commissions from Backman-Stewart in 
recognition of Mr. Lundberg's ownership interest in Backman-Stewart and the large 
quantity of title work provided by Mr. Lundberg to Backman-Stewart does not constitute 
a benefit conferred by the Russells, but was a benefit conferred by Backman-Stewart. 
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Similarly, the commission received by Rodney from the Intermountain Commercial 
Record was not a benefit conferred by the Russells. 
Moreover, no evidence was presented to suggest that there is anything unjust about 
the Lundberg Parties receiving and retaining the benefit provided by the commissions 
given by Backman-Stewart, or anything unjust about Rodney receiving and retaining the 
benefit provided by the commission it received from the ICR. 
Where the Russells failed to present evidence establishing the elements of their 
unjust enrichment claim, the district court properly granted judgment in favor of the 
Lundberg Parties and Rodney on that claim. 
E. The District Court Correctly Ruled That The Russells Cannot Prevail Against 
The Lundberg Parties Or Rodney On Their Unfair Practices Act Claim As A 
Matter of Law, 
1. The Russells Lack Standing to Assert a Claim Against the Lundberg 
Parties or Rodney Under the UP A. 
Standing is a jurisdictional issue that may be raised at any time. Wilson v. 
GlenwoodIntermountain Properties, Inc., 98 F.3d 590, 532-93 (10th Cir. 1996). 
Standing is a question of law. Wilson, 98 F.3d at 593. 
Under Utah law, in order for a person to have standing to pursue a claim, the 
person must be able to show that he or she has suffered some distinct and palpable injury 
that gives the person a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute. Harris v. 
Springville City, 712 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1986); Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 
(Utah 1983). It generally is insufficient for a person to assert only a general interest that 
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he or she shares in common with members of the public at large. Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 
1148-49. 
The Russells claim that the Lundberg Parties engaged in illegal price 
discrimination in violation of the Utah Unfair Practices Act ["UPA"], U.C.A. § 13-5-1, et 
seq., by receiving commissions from Backman-Stewart. The Russells argue that the price 
charged to the Lundberg Firm for TSGs was different than what Backman-Stewart 
charged other persons for TSGs, if one takes into account the commissions received by 
the Lundberg Parties. Primary line cases of price discrimination are brought by 
competing sellers of the product in question, on the basis that the discriminatory price in 
some way adversely affects competition at the level of the seller. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd. v. 
The Southland Corp., 667 F.Supp. 757, 762 n. 7 (D.Utah 1987). Secondary line suits are 
brought by disfavored buyers, alleging that some preferential price given to a competing 
buyer harms competition at the buyer level. Id. 
In this case, the Russells admit that they are not competing sellers of TSGs. They 
also are not disfavored buyers of TSGs. There is no evidence that the Russells ever 
purchased a TSG from Backman-Stewart. The fact that the Russells, to cure their 
defaults, paid to the trust deed beneficiary an amount to cover the cost incurred by the 
beneficiary to reimburse the Lundberg Firm for the TSG it purchased does not make the 
Russells purchasers of TSGs. 
The Russells also have not produced any evidence to suggest that they are sellers 
or buyers of the publishing services offered by the Intermountain Commercial Record. 
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The Russells have presented no evidence that the commissions paid by Backman-
Stewart to the Lundberg Parties or the commissions paid by ICR to Rodney have lessened 
or destroyed competition for them or created a monopoly that has damaged them. 
Where the Russells have not suffered any distinct or palpable injury as a result of 
the commissions received by the Lundberg Parties from Backman-Stewart, or the 
commissions received by Rodney from ICR, the Russells lack standing to assert a claim 
against the Lundberg Parties or Rodney under the UPA. 
2. The UPA Does Not Apply to the Transactions at Issue in this Action 
and the Lundberg Parties And Rodney Have Not Violated the UPA, 
The purpose of the UPA is to safeguard the public against the creation or 
perpetuation of monopolies and to foster and encourage competition, by prohibiting 
unfair and discriminatory practices by which fair and honest competition is destroyed or 
prevented. U.C.A. § 13-5-17. The UPA specifically prohibits discrimination in price 
between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality where the effect of 
such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a 
monopoly in any line of commerce or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any 
person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefits of such discrimination, or 
with customers of either of them. U.C.A. § 13-5-3(l)(a). 
It is not every discrimination in price that is outlawed by the UPA, but only those 
which tend to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. Burt v. 
Woolsulate, Inc., 146 P.2d 203, 205 (Utah 1944); Utah Foam Products Co. v. The Upjohn 
Co., 154 F.3d 1212, 1216-17 (10th Cir. 1998). The party alleging illegal pricing 
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discrimination bears the burden of showing that the illegal conduct may have substantially 
impacted competition. Utah Foam, 154 F.3d at 1217. 
The undisputed evidence in this case is that the price Backman-Stewart charged 
the Lundberg Firm for the TSGs purchased in connection with the foreclosures of the 
Russells' Trust Deed was the same price that Backman-Stewart charged other customers 
for similar TSGs. That being the case, there is no price discrimination and the Russells' 
claim fails as a matter of law. 
This result is not altered by the fact that Backman-Stewart paid commissions to the 
Lundberg Parties in recognition of Mr. Lundberg's ownership interest in Backman-
Stewart and the large volume of business that he provided to Backman-Stewart. The 
Utah Legislature expressly recognized that it is totally appropriate for a seller to charge a 
lower price to one buyer than to another where there is a difference in the quantities of the 
product being purchased by the one as compared to the quantities of the product being 
purchased by the other. Section 13-5-3(l)(b)(i) of the UPA provides as follows: 
(b) Nothing in this chapter shall prevent: 
(i) differentials which make only due allowance for differences 
in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the 
different methods or quantities in which such commodities are 
to such purchasers sold or delivered. 
In view of this provision, Backman-Stewart's action in paying commissions to the 
Lundberg Parties in recognition of the large quantities of TSGs and other title products 
and services purchased from Backman-Stewart by the Lundberg Parties cannot be 
considered a violation of the UPA. 
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This is particularly true where Mr. Lundberg had an ownership interest in 
Backman-Stewart at the time. The fact that the Lundberg Parties purchased most of the 
TSGs that they needed from a title company that was owned in part by Mr. Lundberg did 
not constitute anti-competitive conduct but rather sound business practice. Mr. Lundberg 
had no obligation to purchase TSGs from each and every title company in town. His 
doing business with a company that he partially owns, and receiving commissions for 
business produced for that company, is not prohibited by the UPA. 
There is no evidence to suggest that the business relationship between Backman-
Stewart and the Lundberg Parties lessened competition in the title insurance industry. 
Regardless of whether the Lundberg Parties received a commission or not, Mr. Lundberg 
still would have taken his business to the company in which he is an owner. Thus, 
competition was not affected by the commissions received by the Lundberg Parties. 
There also is no evidence to suggest that the relationship between Backman-
Stewart and the Lundberg Parties gave Backman-Stewart a monopoly in the industry. To 
the contrary, even after the Lundberg Parties decided to send their business to Backman-
Stewart, there continued to be many title insurance companies that offered TSGs to 
customers in the State of Utah.13 
13In the district court, the Russells also alleged that the commissions paid to the 
Lundberg Parties by Backman-Stewart violated § 13-5-3(3) of the UPA. That section is 
patterned after § 2(c) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(c). The analysis of § 2(c) of the 
Clayton Act contained in the Lundberg Parties' memorandum in support of their motion 
for summary judgment on the remaining causes of action in Plaintiffs' Complaint [R. 
627-631.] clearly shows that the Lundberg Parties did not violate § 13-5-3(3) of the UPA. 
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For similar reasons, the Russells' claims against Rodney under the UP A also are 
without merit. ICR's agreement to pay a commission to Rodney, based upon the large 
volume of business which it provided to ICR, is not prohibited by the UP A. The Russells 
have produced no evidence to show that ICR would not provide similar commissions to 
other customers who provide the volume of business provided by Rodney. The Russells 
have presented no evidence to show that this arrangement between Rodney and ICR 
lessened competition or gave ICR a monopoly in the industry. 
K The District Court Correctly Ruled That The Lundberg Parties And Rodney 
Were Entitled To Judgment Against The Russells On Their Civil Conspiracy 
Claim. 
Under Utah law, to prove a civil conspiracy, the Russells must prove, by clear and 
convincing evidence, the following elements: 
(1) a combination of two or more persons, (2) an object to be accomplished, 
(3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action, (4) one or more 
unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result thereof. 
Israel Pagan Estate, 746 P.2d at 790. 
The Russells have presented no evidence to suggest that the Lundberg Parties 
conspired with anyone regarding the Russell foreclosures or otherwise sought to defraud 
them or subject them to any unlawful act. The Lundberg Parties simply performed the 
duties of the trustee in connection with the foreclosures. They purchased TSGs to obtain 
accurate information regarding the property being foreclosed, and to protect them and the 
beneficiary from any damages caused by any erroneous information contained therein. 
The Lundberg Parties also contracted with Rodney to handle the posting and publishing 
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of the notice of sale in connection with the third foreclosure. The actual amounts paid by 
the Lundberg Firm for the TSGs and for the posting and publishing services were billed 
to, and reimbursed by, the beneficiary, who in turn charged those same amounts to the 
Russells to cure their defaults and reinstate their loan. None of those acts involved a 
conspiracy or constituted an unlawful act. 
Backman-Stewart's payment of commissions to the Lundberg Parties did not 
constitute an unlawful act against the Russells, but rather was a legitimate business 
transaction. Similarly, the fact that Rodney was paid a commission by the Intermountain 
Commercial Record cannot be construed as a wrongful act against the Russells. 
In order to carry their burden of presenting clear and convincing evidence 
supporting their conspiracy theory, the Russells must present evidence that does more 
than merely raise a suspicion; rather, it must lead to the belief that the conspiracy existed. 
Id, 746 P.2d at 793; Crane v. Dahle, 576 P.2d 870, 872 (Utah 1978). To be sufficient, 
such evidence must show that the circumstances are consistent only with the existence of 
a conspiracy. Israel Pagan Estate, 746 P.2d at 793 (emphasis added). Evidence is 
insufficient if it discloses acts just as consistent with a lawful purpose as with an unlawful 
one. Id. 
Common sense and reason dictate that evil inferences should not be 
permitted to be drawn from routine business transactions where there are no 
other transactions. To hold otherwise would throw the door open for an 
attack on each and every transaction that one might enter into. 
Id.; Holland v. Columbia Iron Mining Co., 4 Utah 2d 303, 293 P.2d 700, 702 (1956). 
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The undisputed facts in this case reveal no conspiracy, but simply legitimate 
business dealings. The Russells have failed to establish the elements of a civil 
conspiracy, and the district court properly granted judgment on the civil conspiracy claim. 
G. The District Court Correctly Ruled That The Russells Cannot Prevail On 
Their Punitive Damages Claim As A Matter of Law. 
The law is clear that there is no separate and distinct cause of action for punitive 
damages. A punitive damages claim must be based on an underlying cause of action. 22 
Am Jur 2d, Damages at § 741 (1988). Section 78-18-l(a) of the Utah Code expressly 
provides that punitive damages may be awarded only if compensatory or general damages 
are awarded. Where the Lundberg Parties and Rodney were entitled to summary 
judgment on all of the Russells' other causes of action against them, there remained no 
underlying cause of action on which the Russells could base their punitive damage claim. 
Moreover, punitive damages may be awarded only if it is established by clear and 
convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of the 
willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a 
knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the Russells5 rights. 
U.C.A. § 78-18-1(a). The Russells have failed to present clear and convincing evidence 
that would justify an award of punitive damages against the Lundberg Parties or Rodney. 
Based on the foregoing, the district court correctly granted judgment in favor of 
the Lundberg Parties and Rodney on the Russells' punitive damages claim. 
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H. The Court Should Summarily Affirm The District Court's Order Granting 
Summary Judgment In Favor Of The Lundberg Parties And Rodney On The 
Causes Of Action Not Addressed In The Russells' Appeal Brief, 
The Russells have not argued in their appeal brief that the district court erred in 
granting judgment against them on their claims for restitution based on mistake of fact or 
mistake of law, tortious payment of money, wrongful collection, or liability for intended 
consequences.14 That being the case, the Court should affirm the district court's decision 
granting judgment against the Russells on those claims. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Lundberg Parties and Rodney respectfully request 
that the Court affirm the orders of the district court. 
DATED this 30th day of September, 2004. 
Gary A. Weston 
Richard M. Hymas 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
Attorneys for Appellees J. Scott Lundberg, 
Lundberg & Associates, and Rodney Service 
Company 
l4The Lundberg Parties and Rodney were entitled to judgment on those claims for 
the reasons set forth in their memoranda filed with the district court [R. 482-485, 609-
618, 893-895] and in the district court's Memorandum Decision dated August 14, 2003 
[R. 975-981] and Order Granting the Lundberg Parties5 Motion for Summary Judgment 
on the Remaining Causes of Action in Plaintiffs' Complaint, Granting Rodney Service 
Co.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, Granting The Backman Defendants' Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings, and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class dated 
September 8, 2003 [R. 999-1003.] 
\l^JA^C>l • 
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